Problem (Separating similarly named concepts)
One feature of using Rheamerge is being able to share pages. For example, a page explaining induction for one class could be used for another class. Sharing content increases the topics available with little extra work.
There is a drawback with this, if pages with the same name have different meanings in different classes. The word "kernel" of a matrix in Linear Algebra refers to what vectors become 0 when multiplied by that matrix. The case in Abstract Algebra, is the members of the domain which the homomorphism takes to the 0 element.
The definitions are similar (the case in linear algebra is a specific case of the one in abstract algebra) but users in these two classes would want their definition and not the one for the other class. (Plus, in the case of computer science, "kernel" is entirely different)
Solution
One solution is to put in parentheses afterwards what the context is. (This is a fairly usual solution) -- for example Kernel (linear algebra).
I would suspect most pages that probably won't have this issue. However if someone does want to make a new page, and sees the name has already been used, (Suppose "kernel (abstract algebra)" is the new page), one would imagine this is the process:
- User creates Kernel (abstract algebra) adding the context instead of just the name.
- User puts a "Disambiguation note" on the page with just the name, listing this new page.
- If several pages are used equally, the original page could also follow this format (ie Kernel would change to Kernel (linear algebra), and Kernel would remain just a disambiguation page.
Documentation
Note: A page's name needs to be unique to all sections of all classes.
If you wish to link to a page and discover the name is taken, but means a different concept in a different context, then also include the context in the page's name. For example, instead of typing in [[Kernel]] you would type in [[Kernel (linear algebra)|Kernel]]. Then when you make reference to Kernel, it will still link to the right use of the concept.