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<br>Chattanooga>Knoxville: 83 | <br>Chattanooga>Knoxville: 83 | ||
<br>So, 42+42+42+68+68+83 = 345. | <br>So, 42+42+42+68+68+83 = 345. | ||
− | Continuing calculating in this way, we can get the following table of all possible ranking score: | + | <br>Continuing calculating in this way, we can get the following table of all possible ranking score: |
<table border="1"> | <table border="1"> | ||
<tr> | <tr> |
Revision as of 12:24, 29 November 2013
Contents
Ballots: what is out there?
A team project for MA279, Fall 2013
Team members: Qianyu Deng, Sui Fang, Weichen Gai, Chenkai Wang, Bolun Zhang
Introduction (Chenkai Wang)
The main purpose of using ballots in an election is to record the opinions of electorates and their preferences of the candidates. The goal is to determine a winner from the candidates. Ballots come in many physical forms, such as a piece of paper or a digital document stored in a computer. The actual format of a ballot is called voting system or voting method. A voting system has several built-in rules in order to ensure fair voting during the election. Another functionality of a voting system is counting the voting from ballots to determine a final winner. So to specify a valid voting system, we have to describe two key ingredients: allowable votes, i.e., ballots and the algorithms of collecting votes. In this study, we will study how various voting systems are designed and reveal the mathematical reasons in designing these voting systems.
Fairness Criteria
In order to minimize biased opinions in a voting system, we use fairness criteria to measure the "fairness" of a particular voting system. A fairness criteria is a mathematical description of the rules a voting systems uses. In a formal mathematical treatment, we can define the mathematical meaning of the word "fairness" according to these criteria. Here we describe three important criteria and end with Arrow's impossibility theorem. First, we have the following definition.
Definition Let $ C $ be the finite set of candidates and $ N $ be the finite set of voters. Let $ L $ be the set of all total (linear) ordering on $ C $, i.e., it's the space of all possible ballots submitted by voters. Note since all underlying sets are finite, there is no difference between total ordering and well ordering. Each total ordering assigns a unique natural number $ 1\leq\mathrm{rank}(a)\leq|C| $ to all candidates $ a\in C $. A social welfare function is a function $ f:L^N\rightarrow L $. The domain of $ f $ is called the set of preference profiles. A generic element of $ L^N $ has the form $ \langle \leq_1, \leq_2,\cdots,\leq_N \rangle $, where $ \leq_i $ are total ordering on $ C $, i.e., one generic element (preference profile) represents a possible outcome of all voters. A social welfare function represents the process of choosing the winner from one generic preference profile, i.e., giving the final total ordering of the candidates. Let's denote $ f(\leq_1,\cdots,\leq_N) $ by the single symbol $ \leq $.
Unanimity
Definition Let $ a,b\in C $, if $ \forall i\in N(a<_ib) $, then $ a<b $. In words, if every voters prefer one candidate to another, this order should be preserved in the final decision.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
Definition Let $ r,s\in L^N $ and $ a\in C $, if $ \mathrm{rank}_r(a)=\mathrm{rank}_s(a) $, then $ \mathrm{rank}_{f(r)}(a)=\mathrm{rank}_{f(s)}(a) $. In other words, if one candidate has the same ranks in two preference profiles, the rank should also be the same in two corresponding final decisions.
Non-dictatorship
Definition There is no $ i\in N $ such that if $ \langle\leq_1,\cdots,\leq_N\rangle\in L^N $, we have $ f(\leq_1,\cdots,\leq_N)=\leq_i $. In words, the final decision should be different from all elements in a preference profile.
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
Theorem There is no social welfare function satisfies the criteria of unanimity, independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and non-dictatorship for candidates of size greater than three.
Method 1
- Background
- Method
- Abortion reason
Kemeny-Young Method (Qianyu Deng)
History Kemeny-Young method is a voting system first developed by John Kemeny in 1959 and showed as the unique neutral method satisfying reinforcement and the Condorcet Criterion by Peyton Young and Arthur Levenglick in 1978. It uses preferential ballots and pairwise comparison to find the most popular ranking in an election. This method satisfying Condorcet Criterion since if there is a Condorcet winner, then it is always the most popular one.
How it works?
Now,let's look at a previous example of the election on the location of capital of Tennessee we use before to explain how it works.
Example
42% of voters(close to Memphis) | 26% of voters(close to Nashville) | 15% of voters(close to Chattanooga) | 17% of voters(close to Knoxville) |
---|---|---|---|
|
|
|
|
Step1:Find the pairwise comparison in terms of the population percentage
over Memphis | over Nashville | over Chattanooga | over Knoxville | |
prefer Memphis | \ | 42% | 42% | 42% |
prefer Nashville | 58% | \ | 68% | 68% |
prefer Chattanooga | 58% | 32% | \ | 83% |
prefer Knoxville | 58% | 32% | 17% | \ |
Step 2: Create a tally table of the pairwise comparison
prefer X over Y | equal preference | prefer Y over X | |
X = Memphis,Y = Nashville | 42% | 0 | 58% |
X = Memphis,Y = Chattanooga | 42% | 0 | 58% |
X = Memphis,Y = Knoxville | 42% | 0 | 58% |
X = Nashville,Y = Chattanooga | 68% | 0 | 32% |
X = Nashville,Y = Knoxville | 68% | 0 | 32% |
X = ChattanoogaY = Knoxville | 83% | 0 | 17% |
Step3: Count ranking score
Suppose we want to calculate the ranking score of the following ranking:
1st | Memphis |
2nd | Nashville |
3rd | Chattanooga |
4th | Knoxville |
This ranking satisfies the preferences Memphis>Nashville, Memphis>Chattanooga, Memphis>Knoxville, Nashville>Chattanooga, Nashville> Knoxville, Chattanooga>Knoxville.The respective score, according to the tally table, are:
Memphis>Nashville : 42
Memphis>Chattanooga: 42
Memphis>Knoxville: 42
Nashville>Chattanooga: 68
Nashville> Knoxville: 68
Chattanooga>Knoxville: 83
So, 42+42+42+68+68+83 = 345.
Continuing calculating in this way, we can get the following table of all possible ranking score:
1st Choice | 2nd Choice | 3rd Choice | 4th Choice | ranking score |
---|---|---|---|---|
M | N | C | K | 345 |
M | N | K | C | 279 |
M | C | N | K | 309 |
M | C | K | N | 273 |
M | K | N | C | 243 |
M | K | C | N | 207 |
N | M | C | K | 361 |
N | M | K | C | 295 |
N | C | M | K | 377 |
N | C | K | M | 393 |
N | K | M | C | 311 |
N | K | C | M | 327 |
C | M | N | K | 325 |
C | M | K | N | 289 |
C | N | M | K | 341 |
c | N | K | M | 357 |
C | K | M | N | 305 |
C | K | N | M | 321 |
K | M | N | C | 259 |
K | M | C | N | 223 |
K | N | M | C | 275 |
K | N | C | M | 291 |
K | C | M | N | 239 |
K | C | N | M | 255 |
Step4: Find the ranking which gets the highest ranking score.
we see that the highest ranking score is 393 which is the score of the ranking of
1st | Nashville |
2nd | Chattanooga |
3rd | Knoxville |
4th | Memphis |
Method 3
- Background
- Method
- Abortion reason
Conclusion
Bibliography
- Ballots. Retrieved from Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ballot
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